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ABSTRACT
A smartphone is an indispensible device that also holds a
great deal of personal and private data. Contact details,
party or holiday photos and emails — all carried around in
our pockets and easily lost. On Android, the most widely-
used smartphone operating system, access to this data is
regulated by permissions. Apps request these permissions
at installation, and they ideally only ask for permission to
access data they really need to carry out their functions.
The user is expected to check, and grant, requested permis-
sions before installing the app. Their privacy can potentially
be violated if they fail to check the permissions carefully. In
June 2014 Google changed the Android permission screen,
perhaps attempting to improve its usability. Does this mean
that all is well in the Android eco-system, or was this up-
date a retrograde move? This article discusses the new per-
mission screen and its possible implications for smartphone
owner privacy.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K [Computing Milieux]: Miscellaneous; K.4 [Computers
and society]: [K.4.2 Social Issues]
General Terms
Psychology of security, risk perception, and risk communi-
cation; security education and usable security
Keywords
Android permissions, Usable privacy
1. INTRODUCTION
Android mediates application access to different data or
functions via a permissions mechanism. Such permissions
(around 150 [1, 7]) are allocated by Android to one of three
groups:
1. Normal — permissions that enable access to resources
(i.e. data and or functions) with which the user can be dis-
turbed but not seriously endangered.
2. Dangerous — permissions that enable access to re-
sources that may incur costs and/or touch personal infor-
mation.
3. Signature/System — permissions that enable access
to system-critical resources. Those permissions cannot be
obtained via the normal installation route, i.e. from down-
loading and installing an app from Google Play Store.
During the Google Play Store installation process, requested
permissions are displayed via a so-called permission screen.
The user has to agree to grant all the requested permis-
sions in order to go ahead with installation. If the user re-
fuses, perhaps because permissions are requested that are
not deemed necessary to support the app’s functionality
or because there is insufficient trust in the app provider,
the installation has to be aborted. In recent years this ap-
proach has been criticised for various reasons. For example,
some researchers refer to timing as an issue. The permis-
sion screen is first shown after the user clicks on the “install”
button (Figures 1(a) and (b) illustrate this). The user has
already made the decision to install the particular app [13]
and might be less likely to abort the installation. Other
researchers argue that the naming and descriptions of per-
missions are very technical and therefore incomprehensible
to many users [12, 4]. Furthermore, it seems unrealistic to
expect users to learn and remember every single previously
granted permission since around 150 permissions are avail-
able [1, 7]. Finally, it was noted that developers tend to
demand more permissions than strictly required, perhaps in
order to simplify the installation process [6, 16].
In June 2014 Google implemented an extensive update of
the Play Store and changed the permission screen. Figure
1(a) shows the former (Play Store Version 4.6.17) screen for
the“Wetter app”. Here, users are confronted with a list of all
requested permissions that are categorized as dangerous. To
see “normal” permissions the user clicks on “see all”. Figures
1(b) and (c) show the new screen used by Play Store Version
4.8.19. The screen in the middle appears immediately after
the user clicks “install”; the screen on the right shows the
same screen with revealed details. Google has essentially
changed the structure, formulations and level of detail in
their new implementation.
Google also introduced another permission feature within
their Play Store. It can be viewed when the application is
first displayed, before the user clicks on the “install” button,
by scrolling down to the end of the page and then visiting
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Figure 1: (a) on the left: depiction of permissions of Google Play Store until version 4.6.17 including (b) in
the middle: corresponding screen since version 4.8.19 (c) on the right: corresponding screen with revealed
details.
the corresponding screen via the note “permission details”.
Figure 2(a) shows the corresponding screen for the Wetter
app1.
Here we take a critical look at the changes Google has im-
plemented. The focus is currently on possibilities and diffi-
culties the user may experience in protecting their privacy
independently, effectively and efficiently. Therefore, we first
provide a description of the new permission screen and com-
ment on its characteristics. Thereafter, we investigate the
consequences with regard to the user’s ability to make de-
cisions about privacy protection. Next, these findings are
discussed in the context of current research. The article
concludes by outlining a future course of action to improve
the current situation.
2. DESCRIPTION OF NEW PERMISSION
DISPLAY
Google has refined the “dangerous” permissions, allocating
them to one of 13 groups. These are described in some
detail in Google’s online documentation [9]. When users
click on the “install” button they now only see the groups to
which the requested permissions belong (Figure 1(b)), rather
than the permissions themselves. Actual permissions are not
displayed, nor does any description thereof appear. Next to
each group there is an arrow symbol. By clicking on it, a
more detailed description of the respective permission group
can be viewed. This description does not, unfortunately,
contain a complete list of the requested permissions making
up this group (Figure 1(c)).
1Wetter is German for weather.
There is no longer a “see all” button. The user cannot easily
obtain a complete list of all requested permissions, regardless
of whether they are judged “dangerous” or “normal”. Fur-
thermore, at this point only twelve groups of permissions
are shown. The 13th, called “Other”, can only be found in
a separate depiction (compare figure 2(a)), which also con-
tains the complete list of these permissions. The user still
only has one choice: either agree to grant all permissions
and install, or abandon the respective app.
On top of this, with the new permission system Google
has also adapted underlying concepts to the core concept
of the new groups. In the new implementation, accepting
the requested permissions implies an agreement to the en-
tire group of permissions. This means that an app which
was previously given only read access to USB storage dur-
ing installation (therefore the group“photos/media/data”as
listed) could upgrade to write permission without prompt-
ing the user for this escalation in permissions. Direct user
interaction is only needed while requesting a new permission
group or a new permission out of the 13th group ’Other’.
3. IMPACT ON PRIVACY PROTECTION
In this section, we propose and discuss potential privacy-
related consequences that result from the changes described
in the previous section.
3.1 Complicated access to actual permissions
Google’s Play Store does not contain any content-related
description of the groups. In the more detailed display (Fig-
ure 2(a)) there is a link to the online documentation at the
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Figure 2: (a) on the left: depiction of the permissions of the app “Wetter app” since version 4.8.19 via
“permission details” Play Store. (b) in the middle: depiction which is found under “permission detail” while
an app update with additional requested permissions is pending. (c) analogous to (b), but just after clicking
the “update” button right on the top of the app-detail-page.
lower edge. This documentation provides information about
groups, permissions contained within groups and generally
gain insight into the requested permissions. A complete list
of all requested permissions can no longer be found in the
usual place (i.e. on the permission screen which appears
after clicking “install”). This list can only be found via the
above-mentioned and newly implemented second permission
screen.
Both changes complicate access which probably explains
why even an interested and motivated user might lose inter-
est in checking permissions both when installing an app and
when it is updated. Privacy protection in the fast-moving
Android eco-system turns out to be a Sisyphean task.
3.2 Permission Group Agreement
The fact that an app with permissions belonging to an already-
granted group may extend their access to any other permis-
sion within the same group (without informing the user) can
only be found in the detailed page (see Figure 2(b): “Learn
more” link). This means that an app can gain considerably
more access without the user’s knowledge as long as it re-
mains within the approved permission groups. Thus, with
each update, the user’s privacy might be increasingly vio-
lated without their realising it.
3.3 Complicated access to Additional Permis-
sions at Update
If Android demands manual intervention by the user, he/she
has to visit the corresponding app-detail-page in the Play
Store and manually “update” in order to confirm the update
and implicitly also the new set of permissions. After this
once again the permission screen is shown and the user can
agree to the update, or not as the case may be. As Figure
2(c) shows (in comparison to Figure 2(b)), the user is not
able to check the updated permissions, because the category
“Other” is not shown on the permission screen. The user
does not see which permissions he is actually granting. Only
in the “permission details” which are reachable via a link at
the end of the app-detail page, is this listed with a green
“new” (Figure 2(b)).
If the user trusts Google’s statement that he will always be
asked to check and confirm changes in the “Other” group,
and no such changes are highlighted, he/she will probably
not seek further detail. The same applies to a user who
did not read the documentation at all, and therefore in all
probability does not even know about the existence of the
group since it never appears on the permission screen.
Consider an app that not only requires permissions within
the“Other”group but now also requires permission to access
location. Albeit this group will now appear on the permis-
sion screen, the new group(s) are not highlighted so the user
can easily miss the new addition.
In summary, users have to agree to groups of permissions,
grant permissions as before, as a blank cheque, but also
implicitly grant future unknown access permissions within
the same group. These will be taken without consent, nor
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will they even be brought to the user’s attention. If they are,
they will be hardly discernible. This opens the floodgates to
potential misuse.
On top of this, the respective hint is printed in such a small
font, if it appears at all, that users could easily miss the
change. Thus, with each update, privacy might be increas-
ingly violated, slowly and imperceptibly without the user’s
knowledge.
3.4 Unintuitive Permission Allocation to Per-
mission Groups
In some cases apparently thematic matching permissions are
inexplicably allocated to different groups. For example the
permission group “Identity” contains the permissions “Get
Accounts”2 and “Manage Accounts”3. The permissions “Au-
thenticate Accounts”4 and “Use Credentials”5, however, are
found under “Other” and are not visible to the casual user
during installation.
This practice could confuse the user. Without complete
knowledge of the required permissions the user has to make
assumptions about the permissions the respective app will
require. Another example of this kind of practice can be
found in the permission group “Device and app history”.
It contains the permissions “Read bookmarks for websites
and the web protocol”, whereas the permission “Write web
bookmarks and history” is sorted into the group “Other”. A
similar incongruency is the presence of “View Wi-Fi connec-
tions” in the group “Wi-Fi connection information”, but not
the permission “Connect and disconnect from Wi-Fi” which
can be found in the group “Other”.
This means the user cannot trust the information given on
the permission screen when installing an app. Because of
this inexplicable allocation of permissions to groups, the
user’s privacy is endangered since they are likely to miss
relevant changes concerning the access permissions of apps.
Consequently they might inadvertently allow apps to access
their private data.
3.5 Explanations for Unintegrated Permissions
Informed risk assessment and the subsequent privacy-related
decision is made more difficult because explanations are un-
available on the Google Play Store itself. The user has to use
external sources such as websites or third parties to obtain
information. The other option is to install the app first and
check the permissions in the system settings afterwards.
Deep in the system settings of Android one can gain access
to a list of all installed apps and, with a touch, all details
about the app are displayed. This is the only place users
can find an explanation of each and every permission. The
categories used here are, unfortunately, different from those
2Allows an application to get the list of accounts known by
the phone
3Allows an application to perform operations like adding
and removing accounts and deleting their password
4Allows an application to use the account authenticator
capabilities of the AccountManager, including creating ac-
counts and getting and setting their passwords
5Allows an application to request authentication tokens
used in the Google Play Store (at least for the most recent
Android version 4.4.4). For example, with regard to the
depiction in Figure 2(a) in the system setting of “Wetter
App” the term “Photos” or “Media” cannot be found at all.
Instead you find a USB Logo in the respective permissions
list. The permissions of the group “Other” are split up into
three other categories, that are marked with a key-symbol
(“Read google service configuration”), a Wi-Fi-Symbol (“Full
network access”) and a battery-symbol (“Control vibration”)
respectively.
Installing the app and checking the permissions later is, of
course, not an appropriate way to proceed if one wants to
preserve privacy. The app receives all required access per-
missions at installation and belated checking and possible
de-installation cannot reverse a privacy violation that has
already occurred. Due to the missing explanation of the
permissions it becomes complicated to make an informed
decision about the required permissions of an app. To make
an informed decision the meaning and implications must be
clear.
3.6 Impersonal and Harmless-Sounding Per-
mission Descriptions
The new permission descriptions seem more technical than
the previous ones. For example, the old explanation said
(access to) “Your Location” , “Your Accounts” or “Your per-
sonal data”. In the new implementation this corresponds to
the terms “Location” and “Contacts/ Calendar”. A semantic
reference to the individual person is clearly avoided so that a
user tends to associate more with “function” than with “per-
sonal privacy”. By renaming the permission groups a de-
personalization is achieved so that inexperienced users who
are less familiar with technology, a large number, will tend
to underestimate the granted permissions, and not perceive
them as applying to themselves and their personal data.
This could exacerbate the tendency to ignore the permission
screen completely and unintentionally gift personal data to
third parties, thus inadvertently endangering privacy. In the
same vein is the statement “needs access to” located at the
top of the permission screen. This statement is likely to
convince an inexperienced user to the idea that everything
is needed to implement the required functionality. In reality
it might be requested simply because the developer thinks
it could be handy. Users might easily compromise their pri-
vacy due to having gained the wrong impression.
4. CONCLUSION AND OPPORTUNITIES
FOR ACTION
With the new permission screen Google changed many things.
Based on their own statement 6 in order to make it easier for
the user to make an informed decision whether an app shall
be installed or not. Abstraction of the complete list of all
requested permissions into thirteen permission groups with
symbols as recognizable intuitively as possible shall enable
the user to understand more easily to what an app will have
access based on its permissions. If users want all information
about the requested permissions they can only reach these
via “permission details” which are placed at the end of the
6Based on the online documentation “Review app permis-
sions” by Google; last conduction September 29th, 2014
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app-detail-page. The“normal”user who just presses“install”
will not see a large number of the requested permissions and
is probably not even aware of this! In Germany, where the
authors of this article live, response in the general media
was rather muted 7. Exclusively technology-specialized me-
dia such as heise online [11], golem.de [8] or areamobile [3] as
well as androidnext [2] dealt with this topic. These sources
comment mainly on the fact the user now has to grant au-
thorization to permission groups and no longer grants single
permissions, which can lead to a serious escalation of access
rights to apps without the user’s knowledge in case of acti-
vated automatic update (as described above). High-coverage
German speaking general online media such as www.faz.net,
www.spiegel.de or www.bild.de did not even report. A simi-
lar search for English speaking sources (search words: “per-
mission screen play store”) draws the same picture. So far
only technology-specific media has published reports about
the changes. For example www.xda-developers.com wrote
about the possibility of significantly extending access rights
via the auto-update function. They referred to a thread on
www.reddit.com where a user coded an example app which
requests many more permissions after an update to con-
firm this possibility. We could not find any articles in gen-
eral English speaking online media with high coverage (e.g.
www.wired.com or www.bbc.co.uk).
The user is left with this problem. There remains only the
possibility of individually deactivating the auto-update func-
tion for each app and checking each update manually via the
“permission details” link at the end of the app-detail-page.
The new permission screen is limited to showing only the
names of the groups. This may result in the situation where
an app that requests four permissions within one group seems
to have fewer permissions than one that requests one in each
of two different groups. Keeping in mind users mostly do not
understand the complex permission structure of Android [12]
and the fact that people tend to simplify complex decisions
via heuristics makes this abstraction alarming. For example,
someone could have a heuristic that says: “fewer permissions
are better”. This could lead them to misinterpret the true
extent of the permissions they are granting.
The new implementation does not make it possible for users
to make informed decisions (Google’s term). If users, for ex-
ample, want to install a QR-Code-Scanning-App that only
requires (justified) access to the camera functionality [5] they
will probably be confused as this request is expressed unclear
(“Uses at least one of the following elements: camera(s), mi-
crophone(s)”) thanks to the new abstraction. Wary users
have no choice but to go via the complicated route of ac-
cessing “permission details” at the very bottom of the app-
detail-page for each potentially interesting app. Even if we
assume the ideal case of a user who carefully reads online
resources about the new Google implementation there is still
a risk because of the initially invisible group “Other”.
Although Google explicitly says that the user will always
be asked to check changes, those changes only appear in
7A Google search with the terms“Berechtigungsanzeige Play
Store” for the period from May 1st, 2014 till July 31st
”
2014
resulted in only five German hits. (last conducting October
1st, 2014)
the difficult to find “permission details” at the bottom of the
app-detail-page. Most users probably don’t even scroll down
to look at these. Even changes in the twelve shown groups
are not highlighted so checking these is challenging. Users
might even believe that the store operator tests all apps and
deletes dangerous ones [10].
In this respect it seems plausible that in reality the most
likely situation seems to be one in which users have not read
the documentation and therefore only know the screen fol-
lowing the “install” irrespective the “update” button. They
are not aware of any problems, because they do not even
know the permission group “Other” exists. Users cannot be
expected to initiate searching for another screen or assum-
ing that they have not seen all requested permissions. At
this point it is up to Google itself, as well as to the research
community, to clarify and develop better solutions.
Within the research community a number of different pro-
posals to improve the depiction of the requested permissions
[inter alia [10, 13, 14, 15]] have appeared. They wish to
empower the user so as to harmonize his individual wishes
concerning his privacy with selection of apps to be installed.
An extensive analysis and a comparison of the effectiveness
of the different approaches is still missing.
Among other things the research project ZertApps8 sup-
ported by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research
in Germany comes in at this point. Within this project
researchers from Bremen and Darmstadt collaborate to in-
tegrate solutions which provide tools for the user in order to
preserve his privacy. While doing this it is essential to inves-
tigate the comparison of already proposed solutions and the
importance of information that is not easily derived from
the requested permissions. For the user it could be of major
relevance to know with which partners an app is exchang-
ing data with. This will help him to decide whether he has
enough trust in the app and its interaction partners to per-
mit access to his personal data. Furthermore, for the assess-
ment of the application context it could be very important
to see why an app requests a certain permission, i.e. which
function it supports.
The benefit of such information in supporting privacy-related
user decisions must be assessed. Moreover, possibilities to
integrate these in a understandable and usable way into the
graphical interface must be developed. In such a way usabil-
ity and privacy could potentially no longer be antagonists
but integrated concepts.
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